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In recent years, states have subjected more occupations to burdensome
regulatory requirements that are often imposed to fetter competition. There is
broad agreement that many such restrictions reduce consumer welfare and
impose particular burdens on economically disadvantaged groups. This Note
examines why existing tools have failed to constrain this protectionist trend.
Drawing upon U.S. and foreign experiences, it proposes a statutory reform that
would preserve states' roles as primary regulators of occupations subject only
to limited FTC oversight to prevent protectionism and that includes numerous
procedural protections to avoid excessive preemption.
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Introduction
"[W]hile baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, dishing
out special economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains the favored
pastime ofstate and local governments."
Woodworking monks are menaces to society. Or so the Louisiana State
Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors claimed in seeking to put them out
of business with the threat of criminal penalties in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille.2
Nor was this an idle threat: the democratically elected representatives of the
Louisianan people had determined that a person who sells caskets without
thirty semester hours of college-level education, a year of apprenticeship, and
passing an examination deserves to spend up to 180 days in jail or pay a
substantial fine.4
That would be bad enough if it were an isolated occurrence. Yet across the
United States, states have enacted similarly bizarre restrictions on a plethora of
occupations. Louisiana's ban on unlicensed sales of caskets is far from alone,
and, beyond the funeral trade, hundreds of state statutes erect barriers to entry
by placing onerous burdens on those who wish to work in a wide variety of
occupations. Widely regarded as increasing the prices consumers pay and
excluding the economically disadvantaged from well-paid jobs and condemned
by progressive and libertarian commentators alike, these laws nonetheless not
only remain on the books, but continue to proliferate at an alarming rate.
So far, the law has not found a satisfactory way to deal with state-level
protectionist economic regulation. With a handful of exceptions (including the
Fifth Circuit's recent decision in the monks' case), courts have upheld even the
most egregiously protectionist licensing schemes as constitutional. And, in the
post-New Deal constitutional order, it is difficult to see how they could do
otherwise: whether or not intrastate economic protectionism per se is a
legitimate state interest,s the lesson courts have drawn from the Lochner era6 is
f Yale Law School, J.D., 2015 (expected).
1. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013), aff'g 835 F. Supp. 2d 149 (N.D. La. 2011), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:842(A) (2013).
4. Id § 37:850(A).
5. Compare Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218-25 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest), and Katharine M. Rudish, Note,
Unearthing the Public Interest: Recognizing Intrastate Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate State
Interest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485 (2012) (same), with St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 222-23
(concluding that pure protectionism cannot be a legitimate state interest), Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d
220 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'g 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi,
124 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D. Miss. 2000), Peachtree Caskets Direct, Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Serv. of
Ga., No. CIV.1:98-CV-3084-MHS, 1999 WL 33651794 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 1999), and Timothy
Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries,




that they lack the institutional competence to determine whether there is some
public-regarding justification hidden behind an ostensibly protectionist
regulatory measure. Antitrust law has occasionally enabled the FTC to pursue
incumbent-dominated agencies that restrict entry without clear statutory
authority, but the low salience of state politics has meant that statutes often
specifically codify barriers to entry, meaning that state action immunity
protects protectionist legislation from antitrust attack. Indeed, by enabling state
legislatures to authorize what the FTC has expressly forbidden, state action
immunity amounts to a rare example of reverse preemption.
With constitutional law a weak weapon against abusive licensure rules
and barring a fundamental revisiting of Parker v. Brown,7 which seems almost
as improbable as a return to Lochner-esque intensive judicial review of
economic regulation, is there anything that can be done to counter the special
interest laws that restrict entry to occupations? A real solution to the problems
caused by excessive state occupational regulation will likely require federal
legislation preempting certain licensing requirements (either directly or through
an agency, most likely the FTC). But what should that legislation look like?
This Note will argue that the United States can learn from European
moves to liberalize entry and mobility in the professions. In Part I, I set out the
problem of occupational licensing, looking at its extraordinary growth and the
wide range of critics it has attracted from all sides of the political spectrum. In
Part II, I look at the existing toolkit for challenging protectionist licensing
laws-constitutional challenges, statutory interpretation, antitrust, and the
FTC's section 5 authority-and find that each of them only invalidates a tiny
and extreme minority of restrictions, such as where a licensing board acts
without clear statutory authority. In Part III, I take a comparative look at efforts
to scale back barriers to entry and other restraints on competition in the
professions in the European Union generally and in the United Kingdom
specifically. Drawing both upon those comparative lessons and upon earlier
efforts to tackle occupational licensing in the United States, in Part IV, I
propose substantive standards and procedural mechanisms to ensure a
progressive liberalization of labor market restrictions that avoids Lochner-style
second-guessing of states' policy choices.
State Laws That Limit E-Commerce in Caskets, 14 ELDER L.J. 283, 294-95 (2006) (criticizing Powers);
Asheesh Agarwal, Protectionism as a Rational Basis? The Impact on E-Commerce in the Funeral
Industry, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 189 (2007) (urging stricter analysis within rational basis review); Marc
P. Florman, The Harmless Pursuit of Happiness: Why "Rational Basis with Bite" Review Makes Sense
for Challenges to Occupational Licenses, 58 LOY. L. REv. 721 (2012).
While recognizing pure protectionism as a legitimate interest may be dubious, the debate is
largely academic-it will only be in a very small number of cases where no other hypothetical basis for
the law can be imagined. For caskets, promoting one-stop shopping for funeral supplies and services
might well suffice. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
7. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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I. The License Economy
The saga of the casket-making monks of St. Joseph Abbey took place
against the backdrop of a significant growth in occupational licensing. Once
confined to a small number of professions-most notably physicians and
attorneys -licensure requirements have spread far and wide,9 far beyond
'professional' occupations,10 and have experienced particular growth in the last
few decades. In the late 1980s, approximately eighteen percent of workers
required a government license to work;" by 2000, that had grown to
approximately twenty percent.12 Since then that number has grown rapidly to
an estimated twenty-nine percent in 2006.13 That number, moreover, does not
include less intrusive forms of labor market regulation such as certification and
registration;14 Morris M. Kleiner and Alan B. Krueger estimate that six percent
of the labor force is subject to certification requirements.
8. See MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 20-21 (2006); Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and
Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J.
ECON. HIST. 723, 723-24 (2005); Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L.
REV. 1097, 1097 (1973) ("During most of the nineteenth century, state legislatures invoked the police
power only to regulate the traditional professions of law and medicine.").
9. KLEINER, supra note 8, at 21. According to Lawrence Friedman, the first wave of
occupational licensure started around the 1890s. Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and
Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 489 (1965).
10. The exact distinction between "professions" and ordinary occupations has been a
matter of some contention for a century if not more. See, e.g., Abraham Flexner, Is Social Work a
Profession?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 576,
581 (1915) (proposing six criteria for a profession). Cogan summarizes Flexner's six criteria as: "(1)
intellectual operations coupled with large individual responsibilities, (2) raw materials drawn from
science and learning, (3) practical application, (4) an educationally communicable technique, (5)
tendency toward self-organization, and (6) increasingly altruistic motivation." Morris L. Cogan, The
Problem ofDefining a Profession, 297 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 105, 106 (1955).
While some of these criteria may also be the basis for choosing entry restrictions over other
forms of regulation (such as ex post negligence liability), see infra text accompanying notes 46-47, this
Note does not consider the distinction a useful one for present purposes and will generally use the term
"occupation" to cover both professional and non-professional occupations.
11. KLEINER, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational
Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 678 (2010) (using Gallup survey data).
14. Government regulation of entry into occupations or professions has conventionally
been viewed under a tripartite classification of licensure, certification, and registration. Licensure refers
to restrictions that prohibit practice of an occupation without government approval, often on pain of
civil or criminal penalties; certification refers to restrictions that prohibit use ofcertain names or titles
without possessing certain qualifications; and registration refers to restrictions that require the
government be notified of practice of an occupation. Each may have various fees and insurance or
bonding requirements attached to it. See Morris M. Kleiner, A License for Protection, REGULATION, Fall
2006, at 17, 17.
15. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of





Over 800 occupations are subject to licensing requirements in at least one
state. To be sure, this number includes occupations existing exclusively in the
public sector, where the licensure requirement is more closely analogous to an
employer's hiring or sub-contracting criteria than true occupational
regulation.17 A similar analogy might also apply to publicly mandated but
privately funded compliance positions. But many are purely private, and the
requirements are often highly burdensome.19 The Institute for Justice observes
that cosmetologists must undergo considerably lengthier training than EMTs. 20
Interior design, licensed in three states and the District of Columbia, requires an
average of 2,190 days of education and practical experience.21 And in light of
the travails of the monks of St. Joseph, it comes as little surprise that the state
that licenses the highest number of low-income occupations is Louisiana.22
This growth of licensure has taken place despite principled opposition
across the political spectrum. Free market-minded conservatives and
libertarians have long seen this type of labor market regulation as
23undesirable -among others, Milton Friedman wrote profusely on
occupational licensure.24 Organized free market advocacy groups including the
16. See KLEINER, supra note 8, at 5 (citing 2004 data from the Council on Licensure,
Enforcement and Regulation (CLEAR)); Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 189, 190 (2000) (citing 1994 data from the Council of State Governments).
17. For example, a study by the Institute for Justice, the libertarian public interest law
firm that represented the monks of St. Joseph, found that every state and the District of Columbia
required a license to be a school bus driver or a transit bus driver. Dick M. Carpenter 11 et al., License to
Work. A National Study of Burdens from Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUST. 10 (May 2012),
http://www.ij.org/images/pdf folder/economic liberty/occupational licensing/licensetowork.pdf Because
school and transit bus drivers are generally either public employees or work for public contractors, these
licenses are essentially analogous to requirements in the job application process or the contractor's
contract. That might also be true for "Preschool Teacher," regulated in 49 states and ranked by the
authors as the low-income job with the most onerous entry regulation. Id. at 16. There is some indication
that a significant component of the increase in the proportion of the population covered by occupational
licensing requirements is due to the growth of teacher licensing. See KLEINER, supra note 8, at 5
("[F]rom 1984 to 1998, 26 states instituted state exams for entering teaching for the first time.").
18. Carpenter et al., supra note 17, at 10 (listing occupations, such as "milk sampler,"
that appear to be compliance-related).
19. See K.LEINER, supra note 8, at 5 (listing a variety of regulated occupations and their
requirements).
20. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 12, 14.
22. Id. at 22 tbl.8 (seventy-one occupations). But see KLEINER, supra note 8, at 100
(finding that Louisiana licensed eighty-one occupations in 2000, ranking thirty-second; California was
first with 178 and Connecticut second with 154).
Note, however, that Kleiner's count of licensed occupations did not analyze how burdensome the
licensing was, nor whether the reason for a lower count was capacious definitions of each occupation.
Ranking by sheer number of occupations is often misleading: for example, if a state required that every
person involved in healthcare be a doctor, it would only be counted as one licensed occupation despite
the highly anticompetitive effect of requiring a medical doctorate to do a medical assistant's work.
23. See, e.g., George Will, Op-Ed., Will Supreme Court Answer Monks' Prayers?,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-l l-14/opinions/355055391 -cask
ets-funeral-merchandise-funeral-homes.
24. E.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (40th anniversary ed.
2002); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 65-66
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Cato Institute, Institute for Justice, and Pacific Legal Foundation have been
prominent critics of licensing laws.25 On the progressive side, even
commentators generally friendly to regulation often criticize licensure26. its
burdens fall disproportionately on the economically disadvantaged, and it thus
restricts social mobility for the sake of enriching special interests. 27 Even
prominent interest groups such as Common Cause and the AARP have been
unsuccessful in opposing anti-consumer licensing laws.28
There is a remarkably high degree of consensus behind the view that
occupational licensing laws are primarily "designed to give some profession or
occupation monopoly power"29 and that it is "very difficult to argue that most
professional licensure laws are primarily concerned with quality control."3 o As
Walter Gellhom has observed, many licensing laws have little plausible
relationship to the welfare of consumers. He noted protectionist requirements
such as studying information of little practical relevance,3 1 citizenship and
(England ed. 1980); MILTON FRIEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, INCOMES FROM INDEPENDENT
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1954); Simon Kuznets & Milton Friedman, Incomes from Independent
Professional Practice, 1929-1936, NAT'L BUR. ECON. RES. BULL., Feb. 5, 1939; see also Kleiner,
Occupational Licensing, supra note 16, at 190 (noting that Friedman's dissertation covered the issue of
occupational regulation and licensing).
25. See, for example, S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS (1987), a Cato-
published book.
26. E.g., Dane Stangler, Occupational Licensing: How a New Guild Mentality Thwarts
Innovation, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST. (Mar. 2012), http://progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/201
2/04/03.2012-Stangler Occupational-LicensingHow-A-New-Guild-Mentality-Thwarts-Innovation I.pdf;
Jacob Goldstein, So You Think You Can Be a Hair Braider?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 12, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/so-you-think-you-can-be-a-hair-braider.htmi (discussing
states that require years of cosmetology school to practice African hair braiding, which is usually not
taught at the schools and which uses no chemical treatments).
Matthew Yglesias is a particularly vocal critic of occupational licensing. E.g., Matthew Yglesias,
Occupational Licensing Run Amok, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 3, 2005, 11:28 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2009/12/03/195315/occupational-licensing-run-amok; Matthew Yglesias,
Occupational Licensing Does Not Decrease Wage Dispersion, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 9, 2011,
8:27AM), http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/02/09/199866/occupational-licensing-does-not-decreas
e-wage-dispersion. Alan Krueger, who has co-authored studies critical of occupational licensing, supra
note 15, and spoken to the press criticizing it, Goldstein, supra, was until recently Chairman of President
Obama's Council of Economic Advisors.
27. See, e.g., James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with
International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1555, 1566-67 (2010) (observing that restrictions increase costs for those who can least afford it and
exclude them from jobs that could potentially improve their economic position); Ginevra Bruzzone,
Deregulation of Structurally Competitive Services: Economic Analysis and Competition Advocacy, in
THE ANTICOMPETITIVE IMPACT OF REGULATION 5, 10 (Giuliano Amato & Laraine L. Laudati eds.,
2001) ("Those who place high value on the increase in quality may be better off, but those who would
have preferred the option to choose a lower quality at a lower price will be worse off.").
28. Kleiner, supra note 14, at 17.
29. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 953 (1985).
30. Id.





residency requirements, 32  English-only tests,33  and "moral character"
requirements that exclude those with criminal convictions from vast swathes of
the legal labor market and hinder rehabilitation and reintegration. 34
Additionally, lack of reciprocity-between states and sometimes even between
municipalities within the same state 35  enhances the protectionist effect by
fettering labor market mobility even for those already licensed elsewhere.36
Licensing restricts the supply of labor in an occupation and thereby
generally increases the cost to consumers. Studies estimate the increase as
between four and thirty-five percent. 37 Although some defenders of licensing
have suggested that the removal of "lemons" from the market and increased
quality justify the price increases,38 the effect of prohibiting entry into the
market is to create monopoly power. Indeed, because it is a monopoly with the
power of the state behind it, it is immune from many of the weaknesses of
private cartels (such as the risk a conspirator will defect 39) and of self-
regulation (such as the risk that excessive rent-seeking will lead to competition
32. Id. at 14-15. Citizenship requirements were held unconstitutional in 1973, In re.
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), but there remains a circuit split about whether states can discriminate in
licensing against non-resident aliens. Compare LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005)
(permitting exclusion of non-resident aliens on temporary work visas), with Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686
F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding such a provision both unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds and
preempted by federal immigration law).
Federal law requires discrimination against undocumented or unauthorized immigrants, including
DACA recipients, absent a state statute specifically permitting licensure. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A)
(2012); see In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (finding that California had passed such a statute);
see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Ariz. 2013) (ruling that DACA
recipients are not exempt from Section 1621).
33. Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 18.
34. Id. at 13 ("In some states virtually the only 'profession' open to a once-convicted
felon is that of burglar; he is barred from other activities because he is presumed to be a person of bad
moral character, regardless of the nature of the felony or its relevance to his intended occupation."); see
also Bill Keller, Op-Ed., America on Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/20
14/01/27/opinion/keller-america-on-probation.html ("Sherrilyn Ifill, president of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, says another simple measure is to repeal rules that say a felon can't be
licensed as a barber or beautician."); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., New ACLU Report Highlights
Florida's Failure to Address Continued Voter Disfranchisement Problems; Provides Solutions, AM.
Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice-voting-rights/new-aclu-report
-highlights-floridas-failure-address-continued-voter-dis ("For many, the ability to obtain an occupational
license to be able to work is impeded by the precondition that one must pay restitution before being
eligible for civil rights restoration.").
35. Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 15 (discussing intra-state non-reciprocal licensing of
plumbers); see also Lawrence Shepard, Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J.L. &
EcON. 187 (1978) (discussing the impact of inter-state non-reciprocity in dentist licensing).
36. Furthermore, many states allow licensing laws to be enforced directly by a plaintiff
against its competitor through unfair competition laws, eliminating prosecutorial discretion. E.g., Law
Offices of Matthew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Serv., 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865 (Ct. App. 2013)
(holding that a licensed lawyer could sue to enjoin an unlicensed criminal record expungement service
from doing business in California).
37. KLEINER, supra note 8, at 59 (collecting studies).
38. Id. As noted infra in text accompanying notes 42-45, the claim that quality
increases as a result of licensing is dubious.
39. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 23, 31 (1983).
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from other self-regulatory entities).40 Especially where substitutes are
unavailable, licensing thus empowers incumbents to increase prices.41
Empirical studies generally have found that tougher licensing
requirements have little to no effect on quality or even negatively impact
quality.42 For example, a study of Air Force recruits found that more restrictive
state dental licensing laws were not correlated with better dental health43
perhaps because more restrictive laws made it more expensive to visit a dentist
or perhaps because the tougher standards were irrelevant to standards of dental
care. A study that analyzed teacher licensing requirements found significant
negative correlation between requiring experienced teachers to be licensed and
teacher quality in both public and private schools,4 perhaps because the added
cost of obtaining the requisite qualifications made other occupations
comparatively more attractive for the highest quality potential entrants. An
FTC study of television repairs in 1974 found fraud against consumers equally
prevalent in New Orleans (with licensing) and Washington, D.C. (without).45
If, as its proponents seem to suggest, the major justification for licensing is
improving quality, then that justification seems at best empirically
questionable.
That is not to say that the anticompetitive effects of occupational licensing
are never justified. Licensing may, for example, provide a less intrusive
alternative to precise regulatory rules of conduct when an occupation poses
genuine risks of harm. In professions where individualized judgment is truly
46necessary to avoid harm to customers or bystanders, precise rules may be
impossible, and education requirements prior to entry may be a more effective
and proactive way to prevent harm than the vague threat of sanctions (through
tort law or otherwise) after harm occurs. This is particularly important in
40. See S6goldne Barbou des Places, Self-Regulation and the Professions: A
Perspective from Regulatory Competition Theory, in REFRAMING SELF-REGULATION IN EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW 215, 224 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006).
41. The monopoly rents extracted from consumers by protectionist licensing schemes
need not go to incumbents-where a licensing scheme requires education, for example, the provider of
that education can and will charge an artificially high price for it, thereby diverting some of the
monopoly profits to the educator. See Bruzzone, supra note 27, at 10-11.
42. Kleiner collects and summarizes various studies, mostly showing at best weak
evidence of enhanced quality in licensed occupations, with some suggesting that quality increases for
high-income consumers but decreases for low-income consumers. KLEINER, supra note 8, at 52-56.
43. Id. at 9, 50-51.
44. Dale Ballou & Michael Podgursky, Teacher Recruitment and Retention in Public
and Private Schools, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 393, 412, 414-15 (1998). The study found
significant differences between private schools in states where private school teachers were subject to
licensing and those where they were not. Id. at 412.
45. KLEINER, supra note 8, at 55.
46. See IDA E. WENDT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND LIBERAL PROFESSIONS: AN
UNEASY RELATIONSHIP? 32 (2013) ("[T]he heterogeneity of the demand and the specificity of the




professions where self-employment or sole practitioners are common 47 because
sole practitioners may lack certain incentives that are provided by the more
structured environment of the firm. There is a reason why Abraham Flexner, in
a 1915 speech, identified these features as part of his definition of a
profession,48 and a reason why the earliest licensing requirements dealt with the
paradigmatic professions of medicine and law, 49 long characterized by self-
employment or otherwise collegial structures such as worker-owned businesses
rather than strict hierarchies (although this collegiality has long since broken
down).5
By conditioning permission to practice on educational requirements,
licensing may increase the incentive to invest in education and thereby enhance
quality5 1-at least if the mandated education has a genuine connection to the
occupation for which it is required. Licensing might thus be a rational response
if regulators believe that the market is undervaluing education, perhaps because
rationally ignorant consumers cannot distinguish between a qualification from
an elite institution and a diploma mill until too late, or because (as in the case
of emergency room doctors, process servers, or nightclub bouncers) consumers
have no choice in dealing with the licensee.
Licensing has long been used to provide authorities with the ability to
tackle fraudsters proactively by reducing the need to prove individual acts of
fraud; this rationale is particularly true when dealing with vulnerable
individuals whose ability to judge the quality of service providers or to report
fraud is limited. When California faced an epidemic of fraud by sham
immigration consultants targeting desperate undocumented immigrants who
were unlikely to report for fear of deportation, one of its responses was to
require immigration consultants go through a relatively non-onerous licensing
process.52 This both dissuades fraudsters from entering the field and makes it
easier to track them if they do. More broadly, as a response to informational
asymmetry, licensing ensures consumers do not have to expend valuable time
researching the quality of service providers and reassures the risk-averse that it
47. See id. at 96 (observing that self-employment is common, and arguably a defining
feature in many professions).
48. Flexner, supra note 10, at 10.
49. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 489 (discussing physicians).
50. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation,
and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1079 (2005) (observing the commoditization of the
legal profession).
51. KLEINER, supra note 8, at 7-8. But see supra text accompanying notes 42-45
(collecting studies that show minimal or negative effects on quality).
52. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22440-22448 (West 2010) (requiring background
checks and bonding); 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 571 (A.B. 35) (West). Bonding or mandatory insurance
requirements are still barriers to entry, but since they in effect delegate regulation of quality to insurers,
they tend to avoid some of the more egregious rent-seeking problems that can occur with public
regulation.
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is safe to participate in the market.53 It is, however, often difficult to see what
additional benefits licensing provides over a certification regime that regulates
descriptions rather than practices.54 Moreover, even where some license
requirement might make sense, arguments in favor of such requirements do not
necessarily justify an overly restrictive requirement of the type Gellhorn
describes.
In summary, there is a broad consensus that many aspects of occupational
licensing laws in force today are problematic by a wide range of measures.
They are likely both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks inefficient; the burdens they
place on consumers and would-be competitors likely exceed the rents they
provide to their beneficiaries. They appear to create distributional problems by
disproportionately harming economically disadvantaged consumers and would-
be competitors, and it appears that racial minorities are especially negatively
affected. 5 Why, then, do these laws exist? Why have they not only persisted
but greatly proliferated long after the abandonment of the pro-cartelization
policies of the 1930s?56
Public choice theorists have long focused on occupational licensure as a
prime example of organized groups using politics to enrich themselves at the
expense of diffuse majorities. Stigler's seminal The Theory of Economic
Regulation dealt extensively with licensing. He suggested that factors such as
occupation size, income, concentration in cities, and cohesion of the opposition
might be relevant to determining the ability of an occupation to seek legal
barriers to competition.58 More recent research has focused on the idea that
subnational politics is insufficiently salient to prompt diffuse majorities to
mobilize against "regimes" of organized special interest groups and the
53. KLEINER, supra note 8, at 1; see also Thomas G. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing,
4 J. L. & ECON. 93, 106-09 (1961) (discussing informational asymmetry as a key justification for
paternalistic licensing policies).
54. Furthermore, in the Internet era, informational asymmetries are often not as extreme
as they once were. Reviewers, both lay and expert, are often only a click away, and robust First
Amendment protection for reviews means that providers have few means of illicitly manipulating their
online reputations.
55. See, e.g., Stuart Dorsey, Occupational Licensing & Minorities, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
171 (1983); but see Marc T. Law & Mindy S. Marks, Effects of Occupational Licensing Laws on
Minorities: Evidence from the Progressive Era, 52 J. L. & ECoN. 351 (2009) (arguing, contrary to much
of the previous literature, that in certain professions where information about worker quality is hard to
obtain, professional licensing might in fact have benefited traditionally excluded groups).
56. See, e.g., MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 86 (1993).
57. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
ScI. 3, 13-17 (1971).




legislators with whom they form coalitions.59 Empirical studies also suggest
that regulated occupations are more likely to donate to state legislators. 0
II. Challenging the License Economy: The Current Toolkit
A. Constitutional Law
Constitutional challenges are not a realistic way of tackling the problem of
excessive licensing laws: rarely successful, they can at most catch a few
extreme outliers, and extending constitutional prohibitions in this area would
have serious deleterious consequences. Most recent occupational licensing
litigation has come in the form of constitutional challenges to one scheme or
another, often brought by libertarian public interest law firms seeking to
reintroduce intensive scrutiny of economic regulations.61 Using litigation to
attack the license economy seems tempting-after all, the low degree of
electoral salience of occupational licensure laws combined with the high degree
of organization exhibited by professions makes democratic reform more
difficult.62 Leaving aside theories that have never come close to judicial
endorsement since Justice Field left the Court,63 constitutional claims focus on
substantive economic due process, with some Equal Protection, Dormant
Commerce Clause, and occasional First Amendment arguments thrown in.
59. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207, 218-21 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O'Connell eds., 2010) (discussing the public choice literature on the effects of federalism on the salience
of subnational politics).
60. E.g., KLEINER, supra note 8, at 32-35 (studying Minnesota).
61. 1 do not propose to restate the overwhelming body of scholarship explaining why
neo-Lochnerism is a terrible idea. Suffice it to say that intensive constitutional review of economic
regulation "has been thoroughly discredited and repudiated in subsequent cases as well as by
commentators on both the left and the right.... [C]ountless people were hurt-many were maimed or
died-because for decades the government was denied the ability to adopt protective laws." Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1992).
62. Cf JULIANNA S. GONEN, LITIGATION As LOBBYING: REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND
INTEREST AGGREGATION 5 (2003) (reviewing the literature on why interest groups pursue litigation as a
strategy to achieve their policy goals); Richard C. Cortner, Strategies and Tactics of Litigants in
Constitutional Cases, 17 J. PUB. L. 287, 287 (1968) ("These litigants are highly dependent upon the
judicial process as a means of pursuing their policy interests, usually because they are ... disadvantaged
in terms of their abilities to attain successfully their goals in the electoral process, within the elected
political institutions or in the bureaucracy.").
63. For example, the claim that an unenumerated right protected by the Ninth
Amendment is "the prohibition of grants of domestic monopolies in the ordinary trades," MICHAEL
CONANT, THE CONSTITUTION AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 181 (2008), or that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state-granted monopolies, contra The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (upholding a state-granted butchering monopoly,
and specifically rejecting Justice Field's dissenting view that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
monopolies in ordinary trades and avocations). See also Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill
U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (restating the view, again rejected by the Court, that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause required ordinary trades be open to all citizens on equal terms).
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Much has already been written on whether intrastate economic
protectionism can be a legitimate state interest for due process purposes, and I
do not propose to add to it here. It is worth observing, however, that in
Williamson v. Lee Optical-itself an occupational regulation case -the Court
observed that even if pure protectionism is illegitimate, most protectionist
legislation will still survive. Because courts can hypothesize public interest
bases to uphold a law, they will often be able to find some non-protectionist
policy goal. It need not be particularly convincing-it may even be remarkably
67obtuse. It is not for the court to judge whether the imaginary public-minded
legislators adopting the law were correct; all that is necessary is that legislators
who had not taken leave of their senses could come up with some reason to
pass it. For example, a casket sales licensing law could theoretically be based
on a belief that one-stop funeral shopping will help consumers during a difficult
time or that greater concentration in the funeral industry will produce additional
investment.
In short, constitutional attacks on protectionist occupational licensing
schemes will at most eliminate a few outlier statutes. The current circuit split
over casket sales licensing requirements demonstrates just how marginal the
role of constitutional litigation is: even the most egregious instances of
protectionism stand a good chance of being upheld. Perhaps the occasional
casket sales ban68 or photography licensure requirement69 will fall to a
substantive due process challenge; perhaps from time to time courts will find
that blanket, non-discretionary bans on licensing certain classes of persons are
so arbitrary as to violate Equal Protection;70 perhaps a handful of licensing laws
intrude sufficiently into the speech sphere as to create First Amendment
problems.71 The vast majority of licensing laws-even patently absurd ones
64. See supra note 5 and sources cited therein.
65. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a special
interest law designed to favor ophthalmologists and optometrists over opticians).
66. Id. at 487 (hypothesizing reasons why the Oklahoma legislature may have passed
the law).
67. See id. at 487 ("[I]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages
and disadvantages . . . ."); id. at 488 ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."); id. ("For
protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts" (citing
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876))); cf Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J.
Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in I HOLMEs-LAsKI LETTERS 249 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1953) ("I always
say, as you know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job.").
68. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2013); Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'g 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000); contra Powers v.
Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218-25 (10th Cir. 2004).
69. State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 1949); cf Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F.
Supp. 601, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (striking archaic and arbitrarily enforced regulation prohibiting jitneys
in Houston).
70. Barletta v. Rilling, 973 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 2013) (striking down blanket,
non-discretionary prohibition on licensing individuals with felony convictions).
71. But see, e.g., Edwards v. District of Columbia, 943 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2013)




such as Louisiana's florist licensing scheme 72-will survive constitutional
challenge. Constitutional challenges are not a realistic way to reform the license
economy.
B. Statutory Interpretation
At first glance, statutory interpretation looks like a useful weapon against
protectionist licensing laws; in practice, it is almost toothless. Critics of
licensing often point to the captured-by-design boards that administer licensing
schemes-often composed wholly or largely of incumbents in the regulated
industry, they are intended to favor incumbents when challenged by potential
new entrants. Some organic statutes even compel governors to choose
appointees from a list endorsed by a professional association, allowing
decidedly partial lobbying groups to control the board's composition.73 The
theory therefore goes that interpreting the substantive statutes they administer
in a public-regarding way would constrain the boards' discretion to favor
incumbents.
The idea of statutory interpretation as a bulwark against special interest
legislation is not a new one. Jonathan Macey 74 and Susan Rose-Ackerman75
have each proposed the idea of using interpretation as a counter to "hidden-
implicit"76 special interest legislation-statutes "couched in public interest
terms to avoid the political fallout associated with blatant special interest
statutes."77 This view, which focuses on the incentives of the enacting
legislators to claim credit for being virtuous servants of the public good while
actually serving special interests, envisages the courts as "structur[ing]
legislative deliberations to produce greater accountability."
examination and pay various fees), appeals docketed, Nos. 13-7063 & 13-7064 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25,
2013); Edwards v. District of Columbia, 765 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying the earlier request
for a preliminary injunction); Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 957 F. Supp. 2d 774 (E.D. La. 2013)
(upholding a licensing statute that included examinations, fees, and drug testing requirements for tour
guides), appeal docketed, No. 13-30801 (5th Cir. July 30, 2013).
72. Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811 (M.D. La. 2005) (upholding florist
licensing), vacated as moot, 198 F. App'x 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that all plaintiffs had either
retired or left Louisiana in the wake of Hurricane Katrina with no plans to return).
73. E.g., 1914 La. Acts, No. 66 §§ 1-2 reprinted in STATE TIMES (Baton Rouge), July
11, 1914, at 6 (licensing funeral directors and providing for gubernatorial appointments from list of
twenty-five provided by professional association).
74. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
75. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM
OF THE REGULATORY STATE 58-62 (1992).
76. Macey, supra note 74, at 232-33; see also ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 58-
59 (discussing Macey's proposal and suggesting certain modifications).
77. Macey, supra note 74, at 233.
78. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 62.
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The Fifth Circuit's certified question to the Louisiana Supreme Court in
St. Joseph Abbey displayed some interest in this approach.7 But the same case
displays the extraordinarily limited power of statutory interpretation: like many
states, Louisiana has codified many of the most anticompetitive rules. The
statute unequivocally states that "funeral directing" includes "any service
whatsoever connected with . . . the purchase of caskets."so It is hardly
surprising, then, that the Fifth Circuit was forced to abandon the interpretation
approach in its later opinion l-the text is just too clear. Of the twelve states
whose funeral director licensing laws appear to give licensees a monopoly over
casket sales,82 in just one-Texas-has statutory interpretation been
successfully used to defeat the restriction.83 One can certainly argue that courts
should limit special interests' spoils to those they have extracted explicitly, but
that is again an approach that has only a slight effect on the margins.
C. Antitrust and Section 5: The State Action Immunity Problem
Antitrust is similarly a weak weapon against licensing protectionism. The
antitrust world is well aware of licensing's anticompetitive effects. Leading
figures at the Federal Trade Commission have frequently discussed the
problems of public restraints on competition-as one former FTC Chair put it:
Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like trying to
stop the water flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel. A system
that sends private price fixers to jail, but makes government regulation to fix
prices legal, has not completely addressed the competitive problem. It has
simply dictated the form that the problem will take.4
79. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 165-68 (5th Cir. 2012); id at 165 ("[I]n
the discharge of our duty to avoid constitutional decisions we are to inquire if state law can reasonably
be read to offer a state law footing for our judgment.").
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:831(42) (2013). The Fifth Circuit's Order misreads the
text of the statute. 700 F.3d at 166-67 (indicating that the court believed that the statute defined funeral
directing as operation of a funeral home, with all the provisions following the "or" being illustrations of
what operating a funeral home meant).
81. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2013).
82. See ALA. CODE § 34-13-1(16) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1102(11)(c) (2013);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:831(42) (2013); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 32, § 1400(5) (2013) (also requiring a
funeral service license for "helping to meet the emotions and disposition of the bereaved," a category
that would be alarmingly broad if understood literally); MINN. STAT. § 149A.02(19)-(22) (2013)
(applying licensing indirectly through location-based sales requirement); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §
396.2(2)(d) (2013); TEx. OCC. CODE ANN. § 651.001(7) (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
1211 (a)(4)(B) (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2800 (2013); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir.
2002), affg 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000); Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d
434 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Peachtree Caskets Direct, Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Serv. of Ga., No.
CIV.1:98-CV-3084-MHS, 1999 WL 33651794 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 1999).
83. Re: Whether a Casket Constitutes "Funeral Merchandise" for Purposes of Chapter
651 of the Occupations Code and Related Questions, Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0505, at 2 (2002).
84. Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L.




Indeed, even absent the enforcement of antitrust law against private
cartels, there would still be an enormous incentive for entities to seek
protectionist legislation:
[R]ational firms are likely to prefer public restraints. Public restraints can be far
more effective at restraining competition. Public restraints are often open and
notorious. Public restraints also solve the entry problem more efficiently. Rather
than ceaselessly monitoring the marketplace for new rivals, a firm can simply
rely on a public regime that, for example, provides only a few licenses. . . .
While cheating often undermines private cartels, those who cheat on public
85cartels, once identified, can be sanctioned through the government.
It comes as little surprise, then, that the FTC has repeatedly taken on
occupational licensing schemes. Once again, its successes have been minor and
marginal; on the core issue of whether the Sherman Act or Federal Trade
Commission Act can be used against state protectionism, the FTC's defeat has
been almost total.
The reason for these failures is state action immunity. First enunciated in
1943, the doctrine holds that Congress did not intend to preempt state-
authorized anticompetitive behavior. The Sherman Act's legislative history
strongly supports that conclusion. 87 It has been said to represent values of
federalism and regulatory experimentation89 as policy values that may
outweigh antitrust legislation's usual preference for maximizing economic
welfare.
But these values should not blind us to the possibility of abuse. As
currently formulated, once a state decides to rob Peter to pay Paul-to favor
incumbents over consumers and competitors-the antitrust laws stand silent.
State action immunity amounts to a system of (qualified) reverse preemption90:
85. Id.; accord Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1558-62; id. at 1560-61 (quoting
Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of
U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 359, 385); id. at 1561 (quoting Ulf B6ge,
President, Bundeskartellamt, Speech on the Occasion of the Opening Session of the Seoul Competition
Forum 2004: State-Imposed Restrictions of Competition and Competition Advocacy 2 (Apr. 20, 2004),
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/04Seoul-e.pdf).
86. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
87. See, e.g., I PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW T 200,
at 171-73 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing the Sherman Act's legislative history and context).
88. See, e.g., Frank P. Spinella, Jr., Antitrust's "State Action" Doctrine and the Policy
of Commerce Clause, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 653, 657 (1994) ("The expansion of the Parker doctrine is
indicative of the Supreme Court's desire to promote federalism as a paramount principle.").
89. See, e.g., id. ("While competitive markets are generally conducive to efficiency, this
is not perceived as an absolute, to which conflicting state interests must always give way, because
antitrust may, in certain situations, be less conducive to efficiency than state regulation.").
90. Cf I AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 87, $ 217b, at 384 (describing most
antitrust preemption as "conditional"). I prefer to describe it as qualified or conditional reverse
preemption: ordinarily, a competitive market is the baseline; states are the entities that are taking the
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by adding the additional element of state authorization, otherwise-prohibited
arrangements become entirely immune from antitrust scrutiny, however
nakedly protectionist they may be, at least as long as the law avoids delegating
"unsupervised private power to violate antitrust laws."91
Current state action doctrine centers around whether the state in fact
authorized the restraint on competition, with additional active supervision
requirements where the scheme "is carried out by others pursuant to state
authorization. "92 Because states generally speak in the form of legislative
action,93 authorization in state action doctrine is in many ways analogous to
statutory interpretation, although the doctrine appears to have moved from an
Erie 94-like deference to state sovereignty95 to a view that federal law imposes
some additional substantive standards.96 Courts look for "clear articulation"97
when states seek to authorize anticompetitive behavior, a standard that is
strikingly similar to clear statement rules that apply in other statutory
interpretation settings. These rules tend to reflect core principles of the political
action that deviates from that baseline; and, at least in the licensing context, most restrictions post-date
the enactment of the Sherman Act. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
91. 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 87, 1 217b, at 384 (emphasis added). As the
treatise notes, active supervision of delegation has been a particular focus of litigation. Id.
92. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984). This has also been described as a test
of "genuine public control" when the power to restrict competition has been delegated. I AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 87, 217, at 392.
93. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1, 7 (1982)
(discussing how the judicial role in policy-making has been overwhelmingly displaced by legislatures,
whose acts remain on the books long after the reason they were enacted has passed).
94. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The "Erie problem" of interpreting
state statutory law in federal courts (and vice versa) is not unique to the antitrust state action context; it
is a constant problem in a federalist system and one with which courts may be failing to engage
adequately. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (arguing that federal courts often fail to apply state statutory
interpretation law to state statutes and may not even recognize that an "Erie question" exists).
95. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("In a dual system of government in
which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.").
Parker came from an era when suspicion of the public-mindedness of regulators was far less
prevalent in elite legal circles than it is today, now that we have a greater understanding of the incentives
that motivate regulators and regulated parties alike. See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory
of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715-19 (1986) (discussing Parker's public-interest
model of regulation).
96. See Wiley, supra note 95, passim; see also Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54-56 (1982) (holding that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment, which
[presumptively] authorized anticompetitive behavior by municipalities under state law within its general
grant of power, was insufficient to confer federal immunity because it did not affirmatively deal with the
type of behavior Boulder engaged in).
Federal law also imposes a lower bar for those claiming immunity in at least one respect: it is not
enough that a technical violation of state law would render the act vulnerable to state law challenge. City
of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1991).
97. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99-100




order, and as such they have been called "quasi-constitutional." 98 The Sherman
Act99 has been likened to a "constitution of the market";1" because
anticompetitive practices go against the "fundamental national values of free
enterprise and economic competition,",10' courts should only conclude that state
legislatures have deviated from that norm when they do so clearly and
unequivocally.
Once that clear authorization exists, however, the courts do not scrutinize
legislatures' motives or check to see whether the restraints on competition
exceed those necessary to achieve the stated policy goal. If state action
immunity exists, that is the end of the matter. Good reasons exist for this-
most notably, avoiding neo-Lochnerism under the guise of "substitution of
'antitrust' for 'due process' and 'economic efficiency' for 'liberty of
contract.' 102 But in any case, as a means of controlling protectionist statutes,
antitrust thus fails for largely the same reason statutory interpretation fails:
usually, there is just no latitude for interpreting the statutory text as anything
other than an unequivocal limit on competition.
Through the active supervision requirement, antitrust does still have some
bite against delegees that exercise discretion in a protectionist manner. The
Supreme Court has emphasized the need for evidence of state independent
judgment, as opposed to merely rubber-stamping private protectionism. 0 3
Incumbent-dominated boards acting pursuant to ambiguous statutory authority
have become particular targets of the FTC's efforts to curtail state action
antitrust immunity.' A prime example is the Commission's enforcement
actions against the South and North Carolina dentistry boards when they
attempted to regulate hygienists and tooth-whitening respectively without clear
statutory authority, a dispute that has now drawn the attention of the Supreme
Court. 05 While some have criticized the FTC for insufficient regard to
98. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
99. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)).
100. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 120 (2010) ("As amended and expanded, the Sherman Act is an
important foundation of America's constitution of the market.").
101. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (2013); see also
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 100, at 121 (discussing the "enduring principle" of the Sherman
Act).
102. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 488 (1987).
103. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
104. See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, FTC, 2012 Lewis Bernstein Memorial
Lecture at St. John's University School of Law: Returning the State Action Doctrine to Its Moorings
(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/121003stateaction.pdf.
105. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013) (denying
North Carolina's petition for review of the Commission's denial of state action immunity), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 1491 (Mar. 3, 2014) (No. 13-534); S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, Docket No. 9311 (F.T.C. Sept.
11, 2007) (decision and order), http:// www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9311/07091Idecision.pdf.
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federalism and democratic concerns,o it is increasingly clear that the
Commission realizes that protectionist action by incumbent-dominated
-licensing boards is a matter of concern, and it is pushing for financially
interested boards to be treated more like private parties and less like the state.107
That is a welcome development, and one hopes that the trend of courts
subjecting self-regulators to an active supervision requirement will continue.os
In the North Carolina dentistry case, for example, the Fourth Circuit expressly
held that "a state agency operated by market participants must show active state
involvement," 09 and it found active supervision lacking. But it is, once again,
only a marginal limit on the ability of states to restrict competition on flimsy
pretexts, and even that marginal limit may vanish should the Supreme Court
reverse.
For a while, it appeared that the FTC's authority over unfair or deceptive
acts or practices (UDAP) in interstate commercello might provide an
opportunity to take on elements of state regulatory schemes that harmed
consumers. With its rulemaking power confirmed by the D.C. Circuit in
Petroleum RefinerstIl and expanded under the Magnuson-Moss Actll2 (albeit
subject to relatively burdensome procedural requirements l13), the FTC
promulgated a series of rules affecting professions where state regulators were
notoriously industry-friendly-among them funeral directorsll4 and
ophthalmologists." 5 But, while the courts upheld the Commission's power to
regulate private professional associations ll6 and to impose additional
requirements on businesses regulated by state law,"l7 they ruled that the
Commission lacked the power to preempt state laws that required practices that
106. E.g., Ingram Weber, Comment, The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State
Licensing Boards, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 737, 739-40 (2012) ("[T]he state action doctrine originates in a
concern for federalism, not efficiency."); see also Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1589 ("[1]f
citizens, through their elected representatives, choose to forego the benefits of competition to pursue
another value, they should be allowed to do so.").
107. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1576-78 (discussing recent appellate
opinions on the status of industry-dominated boards).
108. Id.; see Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Forrest, 930 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding that "the private members [of the Apprenticeship Council] have
their own agenda which may or may not be responsive to state labor policy" and remanding for
application of the active supervision test).
109. N.C. State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 717 F.3d at 369.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
111. Nat'l Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
112. Pub. L. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012) (detailing special procedures to be followed in UDAP
rulemakings). Compared to the rules applicable to informal rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C §§ 551-559 (2012), the Magnuson-Moss rules are more burdensome.
114. Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260 (Sept. 24, 1982) (codified as
revised by 59 Fed. Reg. 1611 (Jan. 11, 1994) at 16 C.F.R. Part 453).
115. Ophthalmic Practice Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,285 (1989).
116. E.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
117. Harry & Bryant Co. v. FTC, 726 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding the Funeral




it considered unfair or deceptive."' The D.C. Circuit "conclude[d] that the state
action doctrine is applicable to limit the FTC's rulemaking authority,"" 9 found
no clear statement in the FTC Act granting the power to preempt,120 and
accordingly invalidated the FTC's preemption of state optometry law.121 The
First Circuit, on similar grounds, found state action immunity precluded
preemption in FTC Act adjudications.122 Today, then, UDAP authority is at
least as limited as the Sherman Act in its applicability to state restrictions on
competition.
While changes to state action immunity doctrine have often been
proposed, none has come to fruition.123 What can be done? A look at other
systems' approaches to scrutinizing protectionist occupational regulations may
inform a solution.
III. Finding New Tools: A Comparative Approach
The European Union has long been focused on the problem of geographic
mobility and barriers to competition. But it has only been in the last decade
that, with the growth of the Union's powers and renewed focus on economic
liberalization, it has begun to make serious efforts to tackle the morass of
mutually contradictory occupational regulations that long characterized many
member states' labor markets. The European model-a combination of
regulatory harmonization and standards that aim to preserve competition to the
greatest extent possible when member states pursue other policy goals-can
118. Cal. State Bd. of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For more
detailed analysis of the case, see Tod H. Cohen, Double Vision: The FTC, State Regulation, and
Deciding What's Best for Consumers, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (1991). Cohen describes the case as
"a significant setback for the FTC's efforts to protect consumers from anticompetitive state regulation."
Id. at 1250. For the view that the FTC has preemptive power under the FTC Act, see, for example, Paul
R. Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DUKE L.J. 225, 235-43,
which argues that the procedural protections of the Magnuson-Moss Act were inserted precisely in order
to allow preemption under certain conditions, and Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust
Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1976), which argues
that Parker should not apply to the FTC Act but that the FTC should consider state interests.
119. California Optometry, 901 F.2d at 981.
120. Id. at 980-82.
121. Id. at 982.
122. Mass. Furniture & Piano Movers Ass'n, v. FTC, 773 F.2d 391, 392 (1st Cir.
1985).
123. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1585-89 (examining state action
immunity in depth and discussing several reform proposals); see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION
COMM'N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 343-47, 366-77 (2007) (suggesting minor refinements related
to spillover effects and states acting as market participants, and concurring in the FTC's concerns about
insufficient adherence to authorization and active supervision standards, but not proposing major
reforms to state action doctrine). One failed proposal that is particularly noteworthy suggested courts
look at whether state laws "obviously went further than was necessary to achieve [their] avowed
purpose," Gregory J. Werden & Thomas A. Balmer, Conflicts Between State Law and the Sherman Act,
44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 61 (1982), a standard that bears some resemblance to the substantive standard
proposed in Section IV.A but without the institutional and procedural protections I propose.
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serve as a model for federal intervention to control the license economy in the
United States.
The United Kingdom, meanwhile, provides a model for an institutional
approach to regulatory reform to promote competitive markets. Over the last
decades, the Office for Fair Trading (and its predecessor, the Directorate-
General for Fair Trading) has conducted wide-ranging reviews of professional
regulation to ensure that restrictions serve the public interest rather than the
interests of licensed professions. Its reports have been instrumental in
persuading Parliament to repeal exceptions from competition laws that applied
to the professions, and the threat of full-scale competition investigations has
prodded professions to lower barriers to entry.
Additionally, Australia has since 1995 required state and territorial gov-
ernments to engage in wide-ranging reviews of the competitive effects of all
legislation in force under cost-benefit and necessity standards.124 Because my
familiarity with the institutional arrangements and constitutional context in
Australia is limited, I will not analyze the Australian experience in depth in this
Part; I will, however, mention certain aspects of it in passing in Part IV.
A. European Professional Licensing
The "economic constitution" 125 of the European Union has developed out
of the Union's origins as an economic community of states. At the heart of this
regime lie the "four freedoms"1 26: free movement of goods,127 free movement
of services,128 free movement of persons,129 and free movement of capital.13
Since the earliest days of the European Community, fostering a competitive
marketplace has been viewed as vital in creating an integrated, single market
that transcends state borders.' 3 ' Having fought to dismantle tariffs, quotas, and
similar restrictions on cross-border trade, early European leaders sought to
avoid private agreements that had similar effects.132 Although, reflecting the
Union's origins as an association of States with high levels of nationalization,
124. See infra notes 200-203, 221 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998).
126. See, e.g., CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR
FREEDOMS (3d ed. 2010).
127. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 34-35, May 9, 2008, 2008
O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
128. Id. arts. 56-57.
129. Id. art. 45 (workers); id. art. 49 (establishment).
130. Id. art. 63.
131. See GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 39 (2007).
132. Id.; see also Julio Baquero Cruz, The State Action Doctrine, in EC COMPETITION
LAW: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 551, 558-59 (Giuliano Amato & Claus-Dieter Ehlermann eds., 2007)





the treaties are formally neutral between public and private ownership,'33 the
principle of free competition in the internal market is at the core of the
Union. 134
Occupations that require licenses-in Euro-speak, "liberal
professions,, _remain common in all EU member states. Wendt lists a
couple of dozen used in Commission documents, plus a catch-all "other"
category for other regulated professions.' 36 An analysis recently prepared by
the Commission in a review of its regulations regarding mutual recognition of
professional qualifications contained a bizarre list of 196 occupations subject to
restrictions in only one member state,'37 including "laundry maid," 38  wine
taster,"l 39 and "kennel manager.""'4 Montenegro licenses hearse-drivers;141 the
Netherlands, post-mortem animal supervisors.142 A Commission website listing
regulated professions had no fewer than 445 categories in May 2013.143 So far,
so bad.
But the Union's increasingly successful efforts to mitigate the burden of
occupational regulation differentiate it from the United States in a positive way.
Since its early days, the Union has increasingly sought to harmonize disparate
state regulatory requirements; more recently, commentators have suggested that
it has moved to reduce national regulations in certain sectors altogether. " It
has done so through a mixture of preemptory regulation,145 coordination of
member state efforts, and judicial intervention.
133. IVO VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANqOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 880 (5th ed. 2010).
134. That said, the Treaty of Lisbon formally moved the principle of competition from
being an objective of the Union to a Protocol to the Treaties. Damien Gerard, EU Competition Policy
After Lisbon: Time to Review the State Action Doctrine'?, I J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & POL'Y 202,202
(2010). The effect is "largely rhetorical," id., because the substantive Treaty provisions on competition
remain intact and the Protocol's wording is identical to that of the objective in the Treaties pre-Lisbon,
id.
135. WENDT, supra note 46, at 1. As Wendt notes, this jargon is not exactly familiar to
native speakers of English. Id.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Impact Assessment, EUR. COMMISSION 48-53 (2011), http://www.europarl.europa
.eu/meetdocs/2009 2014/documents/imco/dv/impact assesmentpart2_secl558 /impact assesment par
t2_secl558_en.pdf.
138. Id. at 52 (Portugal).
139. Id. at 50 (Slovenia).
140. Id. at 51 (Netherlands).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 49.
143. Regulated Professions Database, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/intemal
market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?action=stat ranking&b services=false (last visited May 4,
2013). The number appears to have declined to 387 since then-perhaps a sign of progress.
144. See infra note 213.
145. Strictly speaking, "Regulation" is a European term of art for a legislative action of
the Union that has direct effect without requiring intervening state action. Here, except when identifying
particular Regulations, I will use "regulation" in the generic sense to mean a regulatory act.
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In principle, there is no state action immunity in European law: states are
under an obligation to ensure that the competition rules are effective, and
therefore they theoretically cannot pass legislation authorizing 'undertakings'
to act anticompetitively.146 This is the effet utile rule-even when a Treaty
provision is not addressed to them, member states may not stand in the way of
it taking effect.147 However, this potentially very broad principle has been
boiled down to three specific rules: that states may not require or incentivize
anticompetitive agreements, that states may not delegate legislative power to
non-independent actors without active and independent public supervision, 148
and that states may not act to place an undertaking in an economically
dominant position. 149
While European competition law has only rarely been used to invalidate
national professional regulation, 1o the few cases where it has been raised may
be instructive for developing a system to tackle anticompetitive licensing rules
without sacrificing the benefits of experimentation that federalism brings. In
the Wouters case, a Dutch lawyer sought to challenge professional rules
forbidding lawyers and accountants from working for the same firm.151 The
court determined that the Orde van Advocaten, the professional association and
disciplinary body for lawyers, was an association of undertakings and thus
directly subject to competition law.152 The fact that the Orde was a public body
under Dutch law did not change this. 153 But, nevertheless, the rule could
survive because:
[N]ot every agreement . . . which restricts the freedom of action of the
parties ... necessarily falls within the prohibition .... [A]ccount must be taken
of its objectives, which are here connected with the need to make rules . . . in
order to ensure that the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound
administration of justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation
to integrity and experience . . . . It has then to be considered whether the
146. Case 13/77 GB-Inno-BM [1977] E.C.R. 2115, 1 31, 35. The evolution of the
doctrine is traced by Baquero Cruz, supra note 132, at 560-80.
147. The rule has been criticized as "a real 'stretch' (if not a 'contra legem'
interpretation)." Gerard, supra note 134, at 207. It nevertheless seems firmly established.
148. In this respect, the E.U. rule is substantially the same as the American one. See id.
at 205 (commenting that the court had adopted "a single test cent[e]red on the notion of 'active
supervision' of the involvement of private operators in the decision-making process, much akin to the
theoretical framework applied in the USA further to Midcaf').
149. Baquero Cruz, supra note 132, at 580. There are also special rules on state aid and
limited competition law derogations for state-supported industries that provide public services, but they
are not material for present purposes.
150. See Case C-309/99 Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten 2002] E.C.R. 1-5177 (upholding a professional regulation preventing lawyers from working
inside an accountancy firm); see also WENDT, supra note 46, at 10 n.33 (collecting cases where the
court declined to interfere with professional regulation).
151. Wouters, E.C.R. 1-5177 % 24-25.





consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of
those objectives.154
The standard by which this would be determined was whether it could
"reasonably be considered to be necessary"155 to achieve a public policy goal.
So far, this sounds like little more than rational basis review in the United
States. But there is more-the court also looks at whether the "effects
restrictive of competition . . . go beyond what is necessary"l 56 to achieve that
goal. In other words, when a public policy goal is asserted, the fact that the
measure adopted might rationally tackle it is not enough-it must also
adequately limit damage to the general goal of a competitive marketplace.
If strictly interpreted, that requirement might force the court to choose
between a myriad of policy alternatives-something judges are manifestly ill-
suited to do. In U.S. terms, it would approach the presumptive invalidity that
strict scrutiny brings. Fortunately, the (admittedly sparse) case law after
Wouters indicates otherwise. The leading case so far, an English High Court
case, suggests that it need only be "difficult to achieve the .. . objective without
the presence of the restriction." 57 This standard, which some have dubbed
"[r]egulatory ancilliarity,"' 58  allows pursuit of non-competition policy
objectives as long as the burden on competition is not out of all proportion to
the claimed public interest goal. This mixture of broad discretion to choose
goals with tailoring requirements that check for overbreadth indicative of
pretexts for protectionism resembles intermediate scrutiny,159 possibly without
the requirement that the government interest be important.
One positive aspect of the European experience is the center's ability to
coordinate liberalization efforts in member states, both through mandatory
mutual recognition rules and softer pressure. The Commission has been
undertaking wide-ranging studies of the effects of professional regulation,160
154. Id. 197.
155. Id.1  107.
156. Id. 109.
157. Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Servs. v. Amalgamated Racing Ltd. [2008]
EWHC 1978 (Ch). [452], affd [2009] EWCA (Civ) 750 (Eng.); see also COsMO GRAHAM, EU AND UK
COMPETITION LAW 99 (2010) (discussing the case and some commentators' reactions).
In its latest case on professional regulation, the European Court found that a professional
association could not monopolize the provision of Continuing Education. Case C-1/12 Ordem dos
T6cnicos Oficiais de Contas v. Autoridade da Concorrencia (Feb. 28, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris
/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=134368&pagelndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir-&occ=first
&part-l&cid=181738. It did not discuss whether the Bookmakers court interpreted necessity
correctly. Id. Like many European Court judgments, both Wouters and OTOC are written in somewhat
vague language, a frequent problem that is probably due to the court rule prohibiting dissents and
concurrences, thus obscuring judges' disagreements about doctrine behind a single oblique text.
158. RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 130 (7th ed. 2012).
159. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
160. See, e.g., lain Paterson et al., Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of
Liberal Professions in Different Member States: Regulation of Professional Services, INST. FOR
ADVANCED STUD., VIENNA (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional-services/studies
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and it has encouraged member states to review existing professional services
regulations to minimize interference with competition.'61 While still primarily
focused on casework, the Directorate-General for Competition has pushed for
the invalidation or repeal of legislation that restricts competition without a clear
public-interest objective.162 While, under the post-2004 competition system,163
national competition authorities have primary jurisdiction where there are not
major cross-border effects, the Commission has coordinated state efforts to
retrospectively review regulations.16 It has also used the threat of investigation
and litigation to incentivize member states to reform their own systems. 165
B. The British Experience: The Office of Fair Trading, Policing the Professions
Within the context of the broader European push to liberalize the
professional services market, the United Kingdom has undertaken several
highly successful steps of its own to review professional regulations to ensure
that they do not burden competition more than is necessary to achieve policy
goals. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has been at the center of this effort.
As a member of the European Union, the substantive competition law of
the United Kingdom is harmonized with E.U. law. Professional regulation in
the United Kingdom occurs through a mixture of statutory provisions and
Royal Charters that empower professional associations to self-regulate. Even
before the latest attempts to promote competition in the professions, the United
Kingdom had relatively few licensing laws outside traditional professions such
as law and architecture; certification was more common.
The United Kingdom's current strategy to reduce barriers to competition
in the professions began with the 1999 Pre-Budget Report, when Chancellor of
the Exchequer Gordon Brown announced a review by the Director-General of
Fair Trading of competition in the professions.166 The Director-General's
/prof services ihs part 1.pdf; Report on Competition in Professional Services, COMMISSION EUR.
COMMUNITIES (2004), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0083:FIN:E
N:PDF.
161. WENDT, supra note 46, at 8 (discussing initiatives by a series of Commissioners to
review professional licensing laws to seek to mitigate anticompetitive effects, while disclaiming intent to
wholly deregulate the professions); see also Mario Monti, Comments and Concluding Remarks of
Commissioner Monti at the Conference on Professional Regulation, EUR. COMMISSION (Oct. 28, 2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_028_en.pdf (discussing competition reviews of
licensing laws).
162. Report on Competition in Professional Services, supra note 160, J 86.
163. See Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
164. Report on Competition in Professional Services, supra note 160, 92-102. See
generally Mary Catherine Lucey, European Union Antitrust Law & Professional Associations: The
Strategic Choices of Soft Weapons by the European Commission, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87
(2008) (discussing the Commission's strategy beyond litigation).
165. Monti, supra note 161.
166. John Vickers, Competition in Professions: A Report by the Director General of




Report, published in March 2001, accepted that barriers to entry might be
justified under certain circumstances, particularly where consumers would be
unable to judge quality,167 but should be limited to demonstrating "basic
competence." While previous efforts had forced most professions to repeal
minimum price schedules and some advertising restrictions,169 other restrictions
were still relatively common. 170 The Report called for the repeal of Schedule 4
to the Competition Act 1998,171 which immunized professional rules from
competition scrutiny. Parliament did so in 2002.172
The OFT has enforcement powers against those who violate competition
law,173 and, on a number of occasions, the mere threat of enforcement action
pushed professions to reform anticompetitive rules.1 74 Its advisory role, formal
and informal, has also been significant. It has a mandatory advisory role under
several statutes1 75 as well as general powers to investigate markets. Since the
repeal of Schedule 4, its power to investigate markets includes the power to
review professional regulations, a power it has used to recommend reforms in
markets ranging from pharmacyl76 to auditing. In the auditing market, the
OFT referred the market investigation to the Competition Commission for a
more formal investigation. Its review of proposed changes in the legal
profession led it to object to a licensing requirement for Scottish construction
142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/reports/professional_bodies/oft328.pdf. On April 1, 2014, the
OFT was consolidated with the Competition Commission to form the Competition and Markets
Authority. Aside from certain enhanced enforcement powers and procedural changes aimed at reducing





171. Competition Act, 1998, c. 41 (U.K.).
172. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 207 (U.K.).
173. See generally A Guide to the OFT's Investigation Procedures in Competition
Cases, OFF. FAIR TRADING (2012), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://w
ww.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/policy/OFTI263rev (discussing the process of investigation and adjudication).
174. E.g., Philip Collins, Chairman, OFT, Speech at the 2006 Annual Fall Conference
on Competition Law: Promoting Competition in Professions: Developments in the UK 1 4.7 (Sept. 29,
2006), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/sp
eechs/sp0906.pdf.
175. E.g., Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 57, sch. 4 (U.K.) (advisory role for legal
professional regulation). The idea of an agency as a pro-competition advocate within government is not
unique to the U.K.-according to Bruzzone, the Italian Competition Authority plays a similar advocacy
role through fact-finding and a formal consultative role. Bruzzone, supra note 27, at 24.
176. The Control of Entry Regulations and Retail Pharmacy Services in the UK: A
Report ofan OFT Market Investigation, OFF. FAIR TRADING (2003), http://webarchive.nationalarchives
.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/reports/compjpolicy/oft609.pdf.
I 77. Statutory Audit: Market Investigation Reference to the Competition Commission of
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dispute attorneys to have an LL.M. from one of two Scottish universities. 179 A
dedicated team within OFT is responsible for overseeing competition in the
regulated professions.' 80
IV. Restocking the Toolbox: A Call to Meta-Regulation
To corral the license economy, legislative action is likely required. Courts
can, at most, affect only a few marginal restrictions; current constitutional and
antitrust law permits most state-sanctioned anticompetitive behavior. The
constitutional and statutory law at issue is relatively settled, and it seems
unlikely to change significantly in the foreseeable future.
I propose that federal legislation should adopt a meta-regulatory model.
Meta-regulation recognizes that the primary, day-to-day capacity to control
occupations belongs to the states but "attempt[s] to steer that capacity toward[]
some kind of desirable outcome," 8 1 here mitigation of the protectionist
tendency to restrict competition in order to provide rents to incumbents. While
usually used to describe interactions between governmental and non-
governmental regulatory systems, it has long been recognized that the concept
also applies to federal-state relations.182 As Scott observes, meta-regulatory
techniques have varying degrees of government control; the common
denominator is that, whether it be as little as tolerating another entity's
regulatory action or as great as setting the policy for the other entity to
implement, the meta-regulator refrains from directly controlling the regulated
parties.
Indeed, the history of federal efforts to preempt protectionist state
occupational regulations demonstrates that one crucial source of opposition was
the fear that federal preemption power would mean direct federal regulation.
Timothy Muris, who subsequently became the FTC's Chairman, raised this
objection, arguing that "[a]lthough the effect of state regulation is often bad, the
performance of the Commission could be worse."1 84 That said, within the broad
179. Application by the Association of Commercial Attorneys, OFF. FAIR TRADING T1
2.16-2.19 (2007), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/sh
aredoft/reports/professional bodies/oft957.pdf.
180. WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 158, at 355.
181. Colin Scott, Self-Regulation and the Meta-Regulatory State, in REFRAMING SELF-
REGULATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 40, at 131, 139.
1 82. Id.; see also Bronwen Morgan, Regulating the Regulators: Meta-Regulation as a
Strategy for Reinventing Government in Australia, I PUB. MGMT. 49 (1999). For more applications of
meta-regulation as a concept, see Colin Scott, Speaking Softly Without Big Sticks: Meta-Regulation and
Public Sector Audit, 25 L. & POL'Y 203 (2003), which discusses performance audits as meta-regulatory
tools, and Colin Scott, Regulating Everything: From Mega- to Meta-Regulation, 60 ADMINISTRATION
61 (2012), which discusses a wide range of meta-regulatory techniques and their application.
183. Scott, supra note 181, at 136-39.
1 84. Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, Constraining the Federal Trade




category of meta-regulatory techniques, some come very close to federal
control-such as requirements that states adopt a plan to meet a federal policy
goal with the federal agency enjoying broad power to veto and direct regulation
of noncompliant states. As I will discuss below, my proposal envisions a much
lighter federal oversight role.
But first, we must look at why this is a matter of federal concern at all.
The primary reason is simple: unnecessary licensing laws balkanize the United
States by making it harder for someone working in an occupation in one state to
continue her work in another state where the occupation is subject to additional
licensing requirements or there is no mutual recognition. This has been so
harmful for military families that the First Lady has been advocating for
legislation to address it.15 The effect can be even more severe for immigrants.
The effect on geographic mobility is enormous. Federal supervision is required
because this harms the national economy and because state governments are
not designed to consider the national interest in a flexible and competitive
economy. As Cooper & Kovacic put it:
In an earlier era, many regulatory controls imposed by states or municipalities
mainly affected the jurisdictions that enacted the restrictions. For these types of
government intervention, spillovers across state borders may have been
negligible. In this context, the political process acted as a check on
anticompetitive state practices. . . . Today a smaller and smaller amount of
commerce is truly "local." . . . Greater integration means that restrictive rules
adopted in one state no longer can be assumed to generate effects only in that
state. . . . [F]ederalism arguments . . . should be reassessed in light of the larger
national interest in promoting a common economic union.186
Federalism is an important part of the American constitutional system,
and perhaps this excerpt fails to do justice to the positive impacts local
experimentation and local values can have.' 87 States face different problems,
Muris use the example of the ophthalmology regulations, noting that they both preempted state laws and
imposed new federal requirements. Id.
185. Jill Biden & Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady and Dr. Biden on
Military Spouse Licensing (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/15/rem
arks-first-lady-and-dr-biden-military-spouse-licensing.
186. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1565; see also id. at 1600-02 (proposing
"finess[ing]" Parker so as to render vulnerable to antitrust challenge state regulations that have
significant spillover effects on other states, at least when the regulations do not align with federal
policy).
The "finesse" proposal suffers from certain flaws, not least that proposals to restrict state action
immunity have long existed without gaining the approbation of the Supreme Court. It also fails to
address the institutional competence problem: how is a court to measure spillover effects (which are
ubiquitous in a modem interconnected economy) or to determine the appropriateness of proposed non-
economic justifications?
187. For discussion of the various justifications for federalism and their reflections in
preemption doctrine, see generally Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1941-48
(2008), and the sources discussed therein.
481
Yale Journal on Regulation
and replacing state licensing systems with uniform federal standards would
remove an important tool in governments' policy arsenals; the problem is the
use of licenses as instruments of protectionism, not licensing per se. Moreover,
states can play an important filtering role in determining what policy issues are
worthy of national attention.
The fact that legislatures pass special interest provisions ought to give
critics of licensing pause for thought. Whatever flaws exist in the states'
systems of representative democracy, the judgment of elected representatives is
entitled to serious deference. Elected legislators continue to vote for
protectionist licensing laws, and such opponents as there are seem unwilling to
spend political capital opposing licensing laws in legislatures or calling out
proponents' corrupt bargains in elections. These laws thus have at least
ostensible democratic legitimacy, and any proposal for reform should not
lightly cast them aside.
Nonetheless, the case for federal intervention in the labor market is
compelling. The labor market, an area where a federal role has long been
accepted, especially to promote interstate mobility, affects key areas of
national economic policy related to competition and economic opportunity.190
Licensing "worsens wage inequality while the higher prices fall most harshly
on low-income consumers,"191 and it thus interferes with key federal policy
goals. It is precisely the kind of area where preemption should operate "to
preserve the United States as a single integrated commercial market in the face
of state legislation that threatens to create multiple markets of suboptimal
scale." 92
I restrict my proposal to the labor market because of these uniquely direct
federal concerns. While a similar framework could arguably apply more
broadly to public restraints on competition, as in Europe and Australia, it is in
the field of protectionist occupational regulation that the need is greatest and
the federal interest clearest. Other protectionist state economic regulations,
such as agricultural cartelization and Certificate of Need laws, may exist with
federal blessing or have their effects sufficiently confined to a locality that
there is little federal interest in challenging them, however unwise they may be.
188. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007).
189. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-218.
190. See, e.g., Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1566-67.
191. Stangler, supra note 26, at 2; see also William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy,
Consumer Protection, and Economic Disadvantage, 25 J.L. & POL'Y 101, 108-10 (2007) (discussing
attempts by South Carolina dentists to require that dentists accompany hygienists providing preventative
dental care in schools in impoverished areas, which would greatly decrease the number of students to
whom schools could afford to provide the care).
192. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
727, 733 (2008) (citing Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006)); see also Merrill, supra, at 745-46 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.




What shape should a statute take? I propose a system with two key facets.
Substantively, it would include rules prohibiting pure protectionism to the
extent it affects interstate commerce and subjecting state rules with significant
anticompetitive effects to a Wouters-style test. Procedurally, it would empower
an agency, probably the FTC, to investigate particular occupational markets, to
identify particularly problematic rules, and to then initiate an adjudicative
process to determine whether they should be preempted.
A. Protectionism Scrutiny: Two Substantive Standards
Legislation should preempt purely protectionist labor market
regulations.193 Perhaps waiver authority could exist to preserve a certain degree
of policy experimentation, but if that is the case, the burden should be on the
state to justify its deviation from the quasi-constitutional broad national policy
favoring competitive markets that enhance consumer welfare.194 Moreover,
applying for a waiver would be a highly public act, probably more so than the
passing of a few low-salience state regulatory statutes, forcing the state to
justify its protectionism to the wider public.
The second standard, adapted from the European Union's Wouters line of
cases, is that, while states must be free to value other policies more highly than
the general policy of a competitive labor market, cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex. When the policy reason for the law derogating from the competition
norm ceases to be served by the law, the law must cease to interfere with
competition. States can choose how highly they value consumer protection,
safety, or any number of other goals-even unwise goals. Democracy and
federalism so require. If Connecticut has a rational reason for believing that
higher training requirements for licensed nightclub security personnel will help
prevent violence,195 it should be able to impose those requirements. But the
existence of a legitimate end should not give a blank check to the state to
displace wholesale the national policy favoring competition. Good public
health and anti-fraud reasons likely exist to regulate embalmers; it does not
follow that, in so doing, a state legislature should be able to displace
competition in standalone casket sales. A standard-deferential, but short of
193. For this purpose, residency and citizenship requirements (to the extent they are not
unconstitutional or preempted anyway) should be considered purely protectionist and forbidden.
Commuter or immigrant status, all other things being equal, has no connection to fitness to practice.
Whether permissible as hiring criteria or not, as licensing criteria they are manifestly protectionist.
194. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOIHN, supra note 100, at 120 (discussing "[t]he right to an
unrestrained market guaranteed by the govemment" (emphasis added)); id. at 121 (describing the
Sherman Act as a "great principle").
195. See Rich Scinto, Governor, New Haven Mayor Denounce Violence that Left I
Dead in City Nightclub Saturday, NEw HAVEN REG., Oct. 26, 2013, http://www.nhregister.com/general
-news/20131026/govemor-new-haven-mayor-denounce-violence-that-left- I -dead-in-city-nightclub-satur
day ("DeStefano made a wide range of proposals ... [including a m]andate that private security at
nightclubs be licensed and trained by the Police Department.").
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blind acceptance-must be set requiring that restrictions adopted to further a
public interest other than competitive markets not restrain competition to an
extent out of all proportion to the claimed interest. When a restriction on
competition is unnecessary to serve the claimed ends, that signals that the
claimed ends are at least in part pretext for protectionism. The standard should
thus allow any policy objective (other than pure protectionism) while requiring
some tailoring to prevent pretextual justifications and restrictions that are
obviously broader than their claimed justifications would necessitate.
This standard is less intrusive than, for. example, the one proposed for
federal agencies by the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures in 1979. That would have imposed a much stricter necessity
standard, a least-restrictive-alternative analysis, and an evaluation of the
importance of the objective,196 which would perhaps be appropriate for federal
regulation but would be wholly unsuited for preempting state statutes passed by
elected legislators. For the same reasons, it is also less intrusive than the
Central Hudson'97 test for commercial speech and the broadly similar test the
FTC itself proposed for its claimed preemption powers in the 1970s.198 It is less
intrusive than the Australian standard, which-while arguably not assessing the
substantiality of the state's interest' -essentially subjected all legislation to
an economic cost-benefit analysis200 carried out by the unelected National
Competition Council201 and provided that restricting competition must be the
only way of achieving the objective.202 The antifederalist impacts of this policy
in Australia were limited by the fact that the states themselves agreed to the
restrictions-akin to an Interstate Compact in the United States-although the
fact that Commonwealth law removes the equivalent to state action immunity if
196. 1 NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL xiii (1979) ("[S]uch action is necessary to
accomplish an overriding statutory purpose . . . and [] the objectives of the action and the overriding
statutory purpose cannot be substantially accomplished by alternative means having less anticompetitive
effects." (emphases added)).
197. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980) ("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial
speech.... [T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest involved .... [1]f the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive.").
198. Verkuil, supra note 118, at 243 (citing reports proposing a test of whether the
restriction was vital to achieve important state goals).
199. See Laraine L. Laudati, Reading Adam Smith into the First Amendment: The US.
Supreme Court Doctrine of Commercial Speech, in THE ANTICOMPETITIVE IMPACT OF REGULATION,
supra note 27, at 71, 95.
200. Competition Principles Agreement 1995 (C.O.A.G.) s 5(l)(a) (Austl.).
201. Morgan, supra note 182, at 55. Morgan notes that a "public interest clause"
allowing for consideration of certain enumerated non-economic factors existed but appears to have had
little effect. Id.
202. Competition Principles Agreement 1995 (C.O.A.G.) s 5(l)(a) (Austl.) ("[T]he




the state is not party to the Competition Principles Agreement203 indicates that
this was hardly voluntary.
A standard-based preemption also interferes less with state sovereignty
than either wholesale regulation at the federal level204 or specific federal
205rules. As a meta-regulatory technique, it keeps the states as primary
regulators subject only to deferential oversight. While it envisions a greater
federal role than today, it does not envision "permanent consequences for the
scope of state authority"206 over occupational regulation; instead, it merely adds
a limited federal oversight role.
This standard is a flexible one. As such, it is important that a proper
institution administer it. For the reasons I will give below, that should be an
administrative agency-probably the FTC-and not the courts.207
B. Courts or Agencies?
Courts are poor managers of any kind of economic policy. The lessons of
the Lochner era counsel against vesting the task of balancing competition and
non-economic policy goals in the courts. Courts are poor at assessing policy
alternatives,208 and judicial second-guessing of state policy goals under a
statutory standard is almost as problematic as doing so under the Due Process
Clause.209 One reason for this is that policy must generally be flexible;210
theories change, 2 11 and the relative weight to be given to non-economic policy
goals is a matter of constant debate. The precedential, rule-based standard of
203. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 51(IC)(e) (Austi.) (formerly Trade
Practices Act 1974).
204. See Merrill, supra note 192, at 731 (calling this "displacement").
205. Id. (calling this "trumping").
206. Id. at 732 (citing Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An
Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1604, 1613-14 (2007)).
207. Congress of course retains the power to preempt specific schemes through
legislation, and it is subject to none of the constraints I discuss here because it has democratic
legitimacy. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 695, 699 (2008). But given that this has not occurred to date-perhaps because of interest group
power or perhaps because generalist legislators do not wish to micromanage in an area where the states
have long taken the lead-I do not consider this a realistic strategy for reforming occupational licensing.
208. Cf JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 96 (1938) (noting judicial
"inexpertness").
209. Cf Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1589 ("[T]he Court would be forced to
perform world-class jurisprudential gymnastics to distinguish antitrust preemption challenges to state
regulation from Lochner-esque challenges to the same thing."); Garland, supra note 102, at 488 (making
a similar point).
210. See LANDIS, supra note 208, at 69 ("[F]lexibility [is] a prime quality of good
administration.").
211. Indeed, one critique of existing state action law is that the doctrine has become
incoherent since Parker's pure state sovereignty theory was abandoned. See Wiley, supra note 95, at
715. Wiley himself, however, proposes a judicial attack on capture-derived anticompetitive legislation.
Id.
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law denies this flexibility, and judicial inexpertness enhances the risk of error;
the same concerns appear whenever judges are asked to review the desirability
of economic regulation.212 It is perhaps for these reasons that a commentator
has observed that the European Commission has provoked less resistance than
the European courts when it has sought liberalization. 213
For that reason, an administrative system is a better way to manage the
balancing of competition and other policy goals. Much as with the O.F.T. in the
U.K. and the European Commission, administrative bodies are more flexible
and more able to tolerate a divergence of views on policies' merits. Agencies
need not confine themselves to individual controversies, and the task of
systematically reviewing an occupation's regulatory structure is one that an
expert agency is uniquely qualified to do.
It is this ability to review systematically the regulations governing an
occupation that will enable the agency to untangle the often-complex webs of
interrelated protectionist statutes and regulations already in force. The agency
could first conduct investigations of a whole occupation,214 identifying rules
that are both substantially anticompetitive and likely unnecessary to achieve
public interest goals. It would then be able, via a more formal adjudicative
process, to conduct a more intensive review of the burdensome rules, statutory
or otherwise, to determine whether they disproportionately burden competition
and should be invalidated.
Perhaps the most important reason for selecting an agency approach is
enforcement discretion. An agency with a monopoly over enforcement can
prioritize and allocate resources to tackle the most blatant and most harmful
protectionism first without creating regulatory uncertainty by challenging the
whole regulatory edifice at once. Courts, by contrast, must adjudge the cases
litigants bring to them, forcing states to devote significant resources to
defending often-valid restrictions against an enormous number of
uncoordinated challenges. An agency with discretion and a monopoly on
instituting proceedings can thus pursue a gradual process of labor market
liberalization-an important point since the threat of sudden deregulation is
212. Cf Garland, supra note 102, at 488 (criticizing proposals for the courts to redefine
state action immunity and drawing parallels between due process-liberty of contract review of state
economic regulation and antitrust-economic efficiency review of the same).
213. Lucey, supra note 164, at 99. The European courts have been widely criticized for
excessive interference with member state economic regulation. See, e.g., Case C-438/05, Int'l Transp.
Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 (holding that a strike violated freedom of
establishment and applying a strict form of proportionality analysis); Case C-I 10/05, Commission v.
Italy (Trailers) [2009] E.C.R. 1-519 (holding that Italy's prohibition on motorcycles pulling trailers
required justification under a proportionality test because it restricted market access); Catherine Barnard,
Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575 (2009) (forcefully
criticizing the "restrictions" approach to free movement law and comparing it unfavorably to U.S.
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); id. at 580 (expressly drawing Lochner parallels); Danny Nicol,
Europe's Lochner Moment, 2011 PUB. L. 308 (making the Lochner- Viking comparison at length).
214. Cf Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1610 (proposing FTC investigations of




much more likely to provoke organized opposition from incumbents who have
invested in overcoming the existing barriers to entry, often to the extent that the
monopoly profits they extract from consumers have been fully capitalized.215
Some commentators criticize the role of agencies in preemption decisions.
Merrill notes that agencies may have a lesser capacity than the courts to
interpret state statutes in good faith and to adequately consider the small-c
constitutional issues of balancing state and federal authority. 216 The good-faith
interpretation issue, however, is less of a problem in the occupational
regulation field, where state statutes are usually clear;217 judicial review can
also mitigate the threat of misinterpretation. And the design of substantive
standards and agency procedure can mitigate the risk that an agency, run amok,
will trample over states' interests. Moreover, as Galle and Seidenfeld note,
agencies' technical expertise means that they may be better than courts at
assessing the "programmatic details and real-world consequences" of
preemption decisions.218 By expressly including agency preemption authority
in the statute, the proposal made here satisfies Merrill's "double consideration"
standard. 219
There is then the question of whether this scheme should be administered
by a new agency or as an additional power of an existing agency. Given that
there is already an agency-the Federal Trade Commission-that has sought to
deal with protectionist occupational regulation to the extent existing law allows
and that specializes in analyzing restrictions on competition and their effects on
consumer welfare, this is by far the most plausible solution. Moreover, as an
expert agency with a role in regulating a variety of products and industries, the
FTC may be less susceptible to capture than a standalone "occupational meta-
regulator." 220
C. Designing a Meta-Regulatory Procedure
Implementing a system in which a federal agency might invalidate the
decisions of state elected officials poses serious challenges, both constitutional
and practical. To take one extreme, a unilateral, broadly discretionary federal
215. Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. 671 (1975)
(arguing that, after the initial beneficiaries of a government transfer scheme, the gains are likely to be
capitalized so that their successors do not get monopoly profits but face large losses if the scheme is
repealed and therefore organize to oppose it). An all-too-real example of this: if you pay upward of
$150,000 in law school tuition to enter the cut-throat world that is the modem legal profession, what
would your reaction be if those onerous hurdles you had spent so much to leap over suddenly
disappeared?
216. Merrill, supra note 192, at 755-56.
217. See supra Part II.
218. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 187, at 1972-73.
219. Merrill, supra note 192, at 767.
220. See Elizabeth Warren, Redesigning Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer
Credit Market, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 391, 414-15
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010).
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agency veto of state derogations from the federal policy favoring competitive
markets, which more or less exists in Australia,221 would amount to a
constitutional revolution if adopted in the United States, radically shifting the
locus of political power to Washington. A proper procedure must respect the
states' primary positions as regulators of occupations subject only to limited
federal pro-competitive scrutiny.
A case-by-case adjudicatory process is preferable to rulemaking because it
is individualized, resulting at most in the invalidation of the particular licensing
scheme at issue. The FTC must not return to the "National Nanny" era,222
promulgating sweeping regulations as Washington's "other legislature." 223 As
commentators-including Timothy Muris, later FTC Chair-pointed out, the
FTC of the 1970s had a tendency to "regulate[] on the slightest pretext" 224 and
without cost-benefit analysis.225 States must be able to pursue their own policy
goals, however misguided Washington may consider them; rulemaking with
preemption power risks denying them that choice.226 Proceedings must focus
on the individual question of whether a particular state scheme burdens
competition significantly more than necessary to pursue the public policy goals
justifying it; de-individualized rulemaking may fail to consider particular state
conditions and bona fide divergences of opinion regarding policy objectives
and thus creates far deeper federalism problems.
Of course, a finding that one state's scheme is protectionist may prompt
other states to amend similar schemes immediately rather than contesting
proceedings, but that choice should be the states'. Individualized proceedings
might also have the salutary effect of incentivizing state legislatures to build a
legislative record explaining the necessity of restricting competition and to
mitigate anti-competitive effects proactively. Indeed, this could even be
incentivized by creating a safe harbor of deference where states establish their
own meta-regulators to engage in systematic reviews of legislation and
regulations on the books. Such a safe harbor would result in a doubly
deferential standard of review for state-reviewed restrictions and in staying
FTC action pending completion of the state review.227
221. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 51(IC)(e)(ii), 150K (Austl.)
(formerly Trade Practices Act 1974); see also S.G. CORRONES, COMPETITION LAW IN AUSTRALIA
1 4.190, at 237 (4th ed. 2007).
222. Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at Al4.
223. Cf Geoffrey Manne & Berin Szoka, Time for Congress to Stop the FTC's Power
Grab on Antitrust Enforcement, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway
/2012/12/20/time-for-congress-to-stop-the-ftcs-power-grab-on-antitrust-enforcement.
224. Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, Constraining the Federal Trade
Commission: The Case of Occupational Licensing, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 77,86 (1980).
225. Id. at 87.
226. Non-transparent use of rulemaking for preemption has been criticized in other
contexts. E.g., JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 44-47 (2006).
227. This would be somewhat akin to the Australian reviews of state legislation but
with a far less severe "stick" for non-compliance-simple deference here as opposed to preemption




In order to protect the states' sovereign interests in self-governance,
procedural protections could be instituted. The Magnuson-Moss Act may
provide a model; indeed, Paul Verkuil argues that the Act's procedural rules
exist precisely in order to protect states' sovereign interests against
preemption,228 although the courts ultimately declined to follow his reading of
the statute.229 Aside from Magnuson-Moss-style requirements for detailed fact-
finding, other sensible protections might be banning preliminary injunctions,
allowing the restriction to remain in effect until the adjudication and review
process is completed. And only the government, not aggrieved private parties,
should be able to seek judicial review of the Commission's refusal to preempt,
allowing judicial review's usual salutary effects on agency deliberations 230
while avoiding the risk that judges will force excessive preemption.
As the O.F.T. example shows, the mere threat of administrative action
may draw public attention to the special interest nature of the legislation,
incentivizing legislators to correct the problem at an early stage lest voters hold
them accountable for their corrupt behavior. Moreover, unlike proposals for ex
ante federal approval in the legislative or regulatory process231 or imposing
mandatory Competition Impact Statements on the states,232 ex post review has
the advantage of allowing the agency to prioritize its targets-a kind of
regulatory triage that would focus on the most abusive or most high-impact
investigations first-and does not force the federal government to meddle with
the state legislative process. Rather, the agency can wait to see what the
legislature produces and then choose whether to investigate.
This does not completely eliminate the possibility that the FTC will
attempt to impose national regulatory standards using its section 5 power once
it has invalidated protectionist state laws that previously created exemptions
through the state action exception. But the FTC can already impose national
standards where states do not engage in "reverse preemption," subject to
political accountability, Magnuson-Moss procedural requirements, and judicial
review, and it has been more careful in its use of its rulemaking power since the
"National Nanny" era. If a regulation can overcome all the other obstacles in its
path, surely a protectionist inconsistent state requirement should not be allowed
to stand in its way, especially when a non-protectionist inconsistent state
requirement will continue to survive.
228. Verkuil, supra note 118, at 235-43; see also id. at 245-46 (discussing the
"hearing" states get on their interests through Magnuson-Moss rulemaking and comparing it favorably
to Congressional fact-finding).
229. Supra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
230. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 187, at 1974-75.
231. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 27, at 1607-10 (discussing this possibility and
commenting that "because states promulgate literally thousands of regulations that may affect
competition every year, the FTC and DOJ could not possibly perform even a cursory review of state
laws at current staff levels").
232. Id. at 1608-09 ("It is hard to envision politicians from any party acquiescing to a
rule that requires federal competition authority input into purely state matters.").
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Conclusion and Prospects for Reform
The license economy has metastasized to the point where it is a serious
threat both to consumers and to the geographic mobility and economic
opportunity of workers. Reform is urgently needed. But will it come?
In this Note, I have tried to present a middle road between the status quo
and the obvious non-starter of removing state action immunity entirely.233
Supervision of occupational regulation by a federal agency tasked with
protecting the benefits of competition while deferring to state policy choices
would not end regulatory diversity in the states; it would provide a much-
needed check to moderate the excesses of existing occupational licensure laws
and to encourage state legislatures proactively to consider competitive effects
in designing new schemes.
One might expect the same special interest groups who have captured
legislatures and procured anticompetitive laws on the state level to organize at
the federal level to block any attempts to deprive them of their spoils. Indeed,
incumbents who have invested in meeting the protectionist entry requirements
are particularly likely to organize against it. But with Washington politics
drawing greater public scrutiny than state politics, licensing on the agenda of
public-interest pressure groups on both sides of the aisle,234 and aspects of
licensing attracting the attention of the White House,235 perhaps the collective
action problems that restrict the rollback of protectionist occupational
regulations at the state level can be overcome at the federal level. Gridlock may
make progress unlikely in the near future, but the bipartisan attention licensing
has received means that there may eventually be cause for optimism.
Indeed, while the constitutional conclusions in St. Joseph Abbey may be
highly dubious as a matter of current doctrine, the threat looms that more
courts, frustrated at the failure of the political branches to curtail protectionist
legislation, will take it upon themselves to review economic legislation more
skeptically. That is what happened in the European Union with Free Movement
law. It is no coincidence that many of the recent cases challenging protectionist
legislation have been brought by the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public
interest law firm with the avowed intent to get the courts to increase their
scrutiny of economic regulation. And they will keep coming-this is a
campaign to pick out the most sympathetic cases and bring one after another
until doctrine gradually shifts in their direction.236 For those who wish to keep
the courts out of economic policy, then, it may be desirable to have some
233. Id. at 1589 (observing that neither the anti-Lochner left nor the pro-federalism
right would tolerate an abolition of the state action exception).
234. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
236. Cf Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
ofLegal Change, 7 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (observing how repeat players gain a strategic advantage




legislative reform soon rather than risk that the courts will eventually deal with
the problem themselves.
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